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HEIRS OF AN ADMINISTRATION: UNLAWFUL
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
Jerome Perez+
The Supreme Court of the United States, in DHS v. Regents on June 18, 2020,
decided to stall the Trump administration from rescinding the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy that the Obama administration created
contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)––even though in 2016 the
Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction on the Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans (DAPA) policy, which mirrors DACA. This blunder
offhandedly sacrifices the Supreme Court’s reputation as nonpartisan by
enlisting itself as the future arbiter of administrative issues with self-evident
resolutions and deciding contrary to those resolutions to endorse a political
agenda. Now, when a President acts unlawfully through their administrative
agencies, subsequent Presidents who wish to uphold their constitutional
obligation and reverse those prior actions has to plea to the Supreme Court and
satisfy the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. Chief Justice Roberts, who
wrote the DHS v. Regents opinion, held that the rescission of DACA by the
Trump administration was reviewable and also arbitrary and capricious against
the APA but failed to consider the illegality of DACA in the Court’s analysis.
This note illustrates the illegality of DACA utilizing the Texas v. United
States case that imposed the injunction on DAPA, juxtaposing the two policies.
The note recommences with an analysis of DHS v. Regents revealing why the
ruling is contrary to the Constitution, Immigration Nationality Act, Homeland
Security Act, and the APA. Lastly, the note reveals the ramifications of the
Regents' holding, citing the Trump administration's twist on midnight
rulemaking.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 15, 2012, President Barack Obama announced that the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) would begin enforcing a new policy: allowing
young immigrants who met certain criteria to be eligible for relief from
deportation.1 President Obama stated that the new policy was designed to
address America’s broken immigration system that the Republican-majority
Congress had failed to reform.2 The Obama administration designed the new
1. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC, EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH
RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN (2012) (“The
following criteria should be satisfied before an individual is considered for an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion pursuant to this memorandum: came to the United States under the age of
sixteen; has continuously resided in the United States for a least five years preceding the date of
this memorandum and is present in the United States on the date of this memorandum; is currently
in school, has graduated from high school, has obtained a general education development
certificate, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United
States; has not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple
misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a threat to national security or public safety; and is not
above the age of thirty.”).
2. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON IMMIGRATION
(2012) (“[I]t makes no sense to expel talented young people, who, for all intents and purposes, are
Americans . . . . In the absence of any immigration action from Congress to fix our broken

Spring 2022]

Heirs of an Administration

407

policies to balance America’s history as a nation of immigrants, on the one hand,
with prioritizing the deportation of immigrants who had violated criminal law,
on the other.3 More than 600,000 individuals have received relief from
deportation under the Deferred Action for Children Arrivals (DACA) policy.4
On November 20, 2014, President Obama’s administration expanded DACA by
issuing an executive action creating the Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans (DAPA) program.5 DAPA would have allowed over four million
parents to receive relief from deportation based on their children’s status,
resulting in the parents’ lawful presence in the United States.6
On January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to
ensure that the executive branch was “[executing faithfully] the immigration
laws of the United States.”7 To comply with that order, Elaine Duke, acting
Secretary of Homeland Security, rescinded DACA on September 5, 2017,
“asserting that the original 2012 DACA memorandum is unlawful for the same
reasons stated in the Fifth Circuit and district court opinions regarding DAPA.”8
immigration system . . . . Effective immediately, the Department of Homeland Security is taking
steps to lift the shadow of deportation from these young people. Over the next few months, eligible
individuals who do not present a risk to national security or public safety will be able to request
temporary relief from deportation proceedings and apply for work authorization.”) (emphasis
added).
3. Id. (“We focused and used discretion about whom to prosecute, focusing on criminals
who endanger our communities rather than students who are earning their education . . . We have
always drawn strength from being a nation of immigrants, as well as a nation of laws, and that’s
going to continue.”).
4. Brief for Respondents at 3, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140
S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587) (“There is no dispute that this decision has life-changing
implications for nearly 700,000 DACA participants and their families.”). See also, Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Data Tools, MPI, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/datahub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca-profiles (last visited Jan. 1, 2022).
5. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH
RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN AND WITH RESPECT
TO CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE THE PARENTS OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS
(2014) (“By this memorandum, I am now expanding certain parameters of DACA and issuing
guidance for case-by-case use of deferred action for those adults who have been in this country
since January 1, 2010, are the parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and who are
otherwise not enforcement priorities, as set forth in the November 20, 2014 Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum.”).
6. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 148 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Of the approximately 11.3
million illegal aliens in the United States, 4.3 million would be eligible for lawful presence pursuant
to DAPA.”).
7. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 30, 2017) (advocating in the policy
section that the executive branch “ensure the faithful execution of the immigration laws.”).
8. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RESCISSION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS DACA (2017); see also, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex.
2015) (“This Court, for the reasons discussed above, hereby grants the Plaintiff States’ request for
a preliminary injunction. It hereby finds that at least Texas has satisfied the necessary standing
requirements that the Defendants have clearly legislated a substantive rule without complying with
the procedural requirements under the Administration Procedure Act.”).
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The decision to rescind DACA sparked the litigation of Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California (Regents), where
the Supreme Court held the Trump administration’s effort to rescind DACA was
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).9
The holding in Regents has rendered the Supreme Court the battleground
between two administrations when a subsequent administration attempts to
uphold its constitutional obligation to “take [c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully
executed” by discontinuing a previous administration’s unlawful conduct;10
because of Regents, the only way for a subsequent administration to win the
battle is to satisfy the APA.11 It was not enough that DACA may be
unconstitutional as asserted in the Duke memorandum or that DACA was
adopted contrary to the APA itself. DHS’s reason to uphold its constitutional
obligation under the Take Care Clause was found not to be rational enough to
overcome the interests of the 600,000 individuals who relied on the continued
implementation of DACA.12
A previous administration’s unlawful action will be continued by subsequent
administrations that wish to rescind the previous action if they inadequately
address those people who rely on the unlawful action. This cannot be said to be
the purpose of the APA, yet the Supreme Court has deemed this so. No doubt,
the holding of Regents will encourage future administrations to adopt unlawful
executive actions, especially when their political opponents in the legislative
branch gridlock negotiations for lawful policies.13
I. BACKGROUND: REGENTS
DHS relied heavily on the ongoing suit in Texas v. United States to rescind
DACA.14 The Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, counseled acting Secretary Duke
9. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915–16 (2020)
(“Here the agency failed to consider the conspicuous issues of whether to retain forbearance and
what if anything to do about the hardship to DACA recipients . . . . The appropriate recourse is
therefore to remand to DHS so that it may consider the problem anew.”).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; see also Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901–02.
11. Id. at 1919 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that the Court has created a “perverse incentive[]” by making the Supreme Court the
place for “political battles”).
12. Id. at 1915 (majority opinion) (determining that an agency must “weigh any [reliance]
interests against competing policy concerns” when acting).
13. John Yoo, How the Supreme Court’s DACA Decision Harms the Constitution, the
Presidency, Congress and the Country, NAT’L REV., (June 22, 2020, 12:40PM), https://www.
nationalreview.com/2020/06/how-the-supreme-courts-daca-decision-harms-the-constitution-thepresidency-congress-and-the-country/ (explaining how an executive agency could force a
subsequent administration to continue an illegal action for several years until reversed by the
courts).
14. U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., LETTER FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL
SESSIONS TO ACTING SECRETARY DUKE ON THE RESCISSION OF DACA (2017).
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on the illegality of DACA and the need to rescind it because it shared many of
the “legal and constitutional defects” of DAPA.15 In Texas, the Fifth Circuit
held that the state of Texas could prevail on the illegality of DAPA on at least
one of its claims.16 Texas claimed DAPA violated the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), the APA’s notice and comment requirement, and the
Take Care Clause.17 Upon notice of the possible illegality of DACA, acting
Secretary Duke rescinded the June 15, 2012, DACA memorandum and
commenced a winding down of the program.18
Shortly after acting Secretary Duke announced that she would rescind DACA,
an array of plaintiffs sued DHS, arguing “that the rescission [of DACA] was
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.”19 All the courts ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs.20 The government filed a petition for certiorari.21 The Supreme
Court granted the petition and merged the cases.22
Avoiding deciding whether DACA was illegal, the Supreme Court held that
the rescission of DACA was reviewable and that the reason stated for the
rescission of DACA through the promulgation of acting Secretary Duke’s
memorandum was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.23
This note will discuss the Regents holding’s importance concerning
subsequent executive administrations’ attempts to rescind preceding
administrations’ unlawful actions. There are many elements of the Regents
holding that will be reviewed in order to understand why DACA is
unconstitutional, in particular, that it contravenes the Take Care Clause and the
15. Id.
16. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178 (5th Cir. 2015).
17. Id. at 149 (“First, they asserted that DAPA violated the procedural requirements of the
APA as a substantive rule that did not undergo the requisite notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Second, the states claimed that DHS lacked the authority to implement the program even if it
followed the correct rulemaking process, such that DAPA was substantively unlawful under the
APA. Third, the states urged that DAPA was an abrogation of the President’s constitutional duty
to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”)(first citing 5 U.S.C. § 553; then citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)–(C); then quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §3).
18. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 8 (acknowledging the reliance interest of
DACA recipients, Duke’s memorandum provides procedures for DACA recipients to renew their
status from the date of the memorandum until October 5, 2017, if their status is to expire between
the date of the memorandum and March 5, 2018).
19. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1903 (2020);
Brief for Respondents at 13–19, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct.
1891 (2020) (No. 18-587) (detailing the procedural posture and parties who brought actions against
DHS’s decision to rescind DACA in California, New York, Maryland, and District of Columbia).
20. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903; Brief for Respondents at 15–19, Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891
(2020) (No. 18-587) (detailing that in the California litigation the district court granted respondent’s
motion for preliminary injunction, while the courts for District of Columbia and Maryland granted
partial summary judgment against the government and vacated the rescission of DACA).
21. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1905.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1916 (“We do not decide whether DACA or its rescission are sound policies. ‘The
wisdom’ of those decisions ‘is none of our concern.’”).
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procedures set out by the APA. Moreover, this note will show why DHS actions
were not arbitrary and capricious and that DHS had unreviewable discretion to
rescind DACA. The note will first review the legal foundation for the arguments
laid out by the parties in Regents. Next, the note will analyze the similarities
between Texas and Regents, providing insight into the legality of DACA. Then,
the note will extract from Regents the precedent established by the Supreme
Court when subsequent administrations try to rescind unlawful actions. Lastly,
the note will express the concern of abuse by post Regents administrations that
will rely on the Regents holding to shackle subsequent administrations’ attempts
to rescind unlawful actions.
II. PRIOR LAW
A. How the Constitution Checks the President: The Take Care Clause
Article II, Section 3 provides in relevant part, “[the President] shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”24 Jack L. Goldsmith and John F. Manning,
both Professors of Law at Harvard Law School, conveniently organize the Take
Care Clause into five categories.25 First, the Take Care Clause helps to
determine the President’s removal power.26 Case law articulates this power as
a presidential duty to guarantee “competence, observance of law, and prevention
of misconduct.”27
Second, the Take Care Clause influences aspects of the standing doctrine.28
The courts, referring to the Take Care Clause, have denied standing on the basis
that granting standing would intrude on exclusive executive authority to ensure
the faithful execution of the law.29
Third, in cases where executive agencies had invoked the Take Care Clause
when their non-enforcement actions were challenged, courts have held executive
agencies can exercise broad prosecutorial discretion.30 The Supreme Court
reasons that non-enforcement by an agency is analogous to prosecutorial
discretion not to indict and such discretion is not reviewable by the courts
because “such a decision has traditionally been ‘committed to agency
discretion,’ and . . . Congress enacting the APA did not intend to alter that
tradition.”31 Similarly, in United States v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court held
that officers delegated by statute to serve the President have broad discretion to

24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
25. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835, 1839–53 (2016).
26. Id. at 1839.
27. Id. at 1842.
28. Id. at 1844.
29. Id. at 1845–47.
30. Id. at 1847.
31. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
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enforce the federal criminal law because they help “[T]ake Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”32
Fourth, it has been determined that the Take Care Clause prohibits the
Executive Branch from making laws and deciding not to enforce the laws made
by Congress.33 This limitation granted by the Take Care Clause was recognized
in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case),
rejecting President Truman’s ability to seize steel mills for continued war
efforts.34 The Supreme Court ruled that the President’s obligation to see “the
laws are faithfully executed” does not mean he is to be a lawmaker.35 The Steel
Seizure Case majority has been interpreted to mean that the Take Care Clause
obliges the President to abide by the “means and ends of statutory policy power
specified by Congress.”36 This idea is encapsulated in Justice Jackson’s famous
observation in his concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case that, “a governmental
authority that reaches so far as there is law . . . . signif[ies] . . . that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if
under rules.”37
Fifth, the Take Care Clause allows the President “to take ‘incidental’
measures that may be necessary to effectuate statutory commands.”38 This
principle is articulated in In re Neagle, and Goldsmith and Manning describe it
as the President’s “completion power.”39 What was at issue in Neagle was
whether the Attorney General was able to assign U.S. Marshall Neagle to protect
Supreme Court Justice Field while riding circuit when there was no law passed
by Congress allowing such an assignment.40 The Neagle case interpreted the
Take Care Clause as inferring duties beyond those contained in acts of Congress
but also to “include the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the
32. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3);
see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 25, at 1848.
33. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 25, at 1848–49.
34. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582, 589 (1952) (“The Founders
of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It
would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that
lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot
stand.”).
35. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 25, at 1849 (citing to Youngstown 343 U.S. at 587–
88).
36. Id. at 1849–50; Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 587 (“President’s power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions
in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he
thinks bad.”).
37. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 646 (Jackson J. concurring in the judgment and opinion of the court).
38. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 25, at 1851.
39. Id. at 1851, 1853 (“President’s authority to ensure the faithful execution of the laws surely
provided authority for the executive, acting through the Attorney General, to provide protection for
a federal officer in the performance of official duties, even in the absence of express statutory
authority to do so.”).
40. Id. at 1851–52 (citing In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 5, 58 (1890)).
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Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by
the nature of the government under the Constitution[.]”41
B. Playing by the Rules: Administrative Procedure Act
1. Judicial Review and the Exceptions
The APA provides that judicial review is precluded if the relevant statute
precludes it or when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”42
The APA also clarifies that “agency action” consists of agency “rule[s],”
meaning a statement made by the agency with the effect of implementing law or
describing procedures.43 The scope of judicial review is limited to “all relevant
questions of law, interpret[ing] [the meaning of] constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determining the meaning or applicability of terms of an agency
action.”44 The court shall hold unlawful and terminate agency action when it is
“found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”45
Except when judicial review of agency action is precluded by a relevant
statute or precluded by a grant of agency discretion by law, there is a basic
presumption of judicial review if any person suffered a legal wrong or is
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action.46 The exceptions to the
presumption of judicial review are to be narrowly constrained, limited to
traditional decisions left to agency discretion.47 Non-enforcement agency action
fits within the limited category exempt from the presumption of judicial
review.48
41. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64–65 (1890) (holding that the Take Care Clause allows the
executive in the absence of a statute, “make an order for the protection of the mail and of the persons
and lives of its carriers”).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
43. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (13).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
47. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (“An agency’s ‘decision not to enforce
often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise,’ and for this and other good reasons, we concluded, ‘such a decision has traditionally
been committed to agency discretion.’”).
48. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985) (“This recognition of the existence
of discretion is attributable . . . to the general unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions
to refuse enforcement. The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an agency
decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has
occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the
agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits
the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake
the action at all . . . . The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many
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2. Rule making: Notice and Comment
The APA also sets a notice and comment process when agencies engage in
rule making. The APA states, “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall
be published in the Federal Register.”49 This notice must include “(1) a
statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2)
reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved.”50 After the agency has provided notice, it must allow
concerned parties to submit a comment.51 “Only after complet[ion] [of the
notice-and-comment] process is the legislative rule a valid law.”52
The notice and comment process has two exceptions: “interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice,” and if an agency finds for good cause “that notice and public
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.”53 The first exception has been interpreted to mean that the notice and
comment process applies if a rule is substantive.54

variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities. Similar concerns animate the principles
of administrative law that courts generally will defer to an agency’s construction of the statute it is
charged with implementing, and to the procedures it adopts for implementing that statute. In
addition to these administrative concerns, we note that when an agency refuses to act it generally
does not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does
not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect . . . . Finally, we recognize that
an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision
of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as
the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by
the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”). The creation of DACA, like
DAPA, does not fit within this narrow exception because it is not only non-enforcement agency
action, but also confers “lawful presence,” which is something Congress did not grant them the
power to do. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1922
(2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). To discontinue
DACA would be simply to revert back to the default federal laws of immigration, and the reason
why the recission of DACA falls within the “non-enforcement” exception. Therefore, if DACA
was a lawful action that did not require reviewability by the APA, then it follows that it carries the
same non-reviewability upon recission. See id.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). According to the APA, “‘rule making’ means agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” 5 U.S.C § 551(5).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3).
51. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), (e).
52. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1927–28 (describing how the creation of DACA,
like DAPA, did not go through the requisite notice and comment procedures because the rule that
created DACA carries legal force).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)–(B).
54. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1927 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 441
U.S. 281, 295 (1979)) (describing how DACA created a new category of lawfully present
individuals contravening statutory limits and therefore is a substantive rule).
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C. Discretion Granted by Congress: INA and HSA
1. INA
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) grants the executive branch of
the federal government broad discretion to enforce the immigration laws of the
United States.55 The INA states, the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall
establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and
other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems
necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.”56
Yet, case law has not interpreted this to mean unlimited discretion. Courts have
concluded that if Congress has closely tailored provisions and allowed limited
access to benefits to specified groups of individuals, an agency cannot act
substantively contrary to law and create policy granting access to a new class of
individuals not previously contemplated by Congress.57 The Secretary of
Homeland Security is also obligated to administer and enforce “all other laws
relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens,” except when
such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon
the President, Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the officers of
the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers: provided,
however, [t]hat determination and ruling by the Attorney General with
respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.58
Because Congress has closely tailored its immigration laws concerning the
eligibility of benefits, it follows that any group not mentioned is excluded from
such benefits and cannot receive a free pass from the Secretary of Homeland
Security.59
2. HSA
Another broad grant of discretion authorized by Congress can be found in the
Homeland Security Act (HSA). The HSA provides in relevant part:
The Secretary shall be responsible for the following:
(1) Preventing the entry of terrorists and the instruments of
terrorism into the United States.
(2) Securing the borders, territorial waters, ports, terminals,
waterways, and air, land, and sea transportation systems of
55. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103.
56. 8 U.S.C § 1103(a)(3).
57. See Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 715–16 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (recognizing
that the statutory scheme of the INA did not encompass individuals described under DACA); see
also Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 706 F.3d 499, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(indicating that when Congress provides straightforward statutory schematics, an agency cannot
ignore and escape the limit of the scheme with “linguistic jujitsu” to extend its regulatory authority).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (emphasis in original).
59. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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the United States, including managing and coordinating
those functions transferred to the Department at ports of
entry.
(3) Carrying out the immigration enforcement functions
vested by statute in, or performed by, the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization (or any officer, employee,
or component of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service) immediately before the date on which the transfer
of functions specified under section 251 of this title takes
effect.
(4) Establishing and administering rules, in accordance with
section 236 of this title, governing the granting of visas or
other forms of permission, including parole, to enter the
United States to individuals who are not a citizen or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States.
(5) Establishing national immigration enforcement policies
and priorities.60
This provision of the HSA, similar to the INA, does not provide the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security with the authority to ignore and create
policy contrary to the complex statutory scheme formulated by Congress
granting lawful presence and work authorization.61
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S BLUNDER
A. Texas v. United States
After DACA was created, Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson wrote a
memorandum to DHS to expand DACA and create DAPA on November 20,
2014.62 The DAPA memorandum targeted parents of U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents and granted the parents deferment from deportation.63 The
parents must have “continuously resided in the United States since before
January 1, 2010;” be present during the date of the DAPA memorandum and
when making a request for deferred action; are not a “threat[] to national
security, border security, and public safety;” or are not violators of certain
60. 6 U.S.C. § 202.
61. Texas, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 714–15 (rejecting defendants’ argument that the creation of
DAPA and DACA were in accordance with discretion granting provisions of the INA and HSA
and deciding instead that the programs violated the substantive provisions of the APA because the
Secretary acted without Congressional authority).
62. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5, at 1 (“This memorandum is intended to
reflect new policies for the use of deferred action. By memorandum dated June 15, 2012, Secretary
Napolitano issued guidance entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children.”).
63. Id. at 4.
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immigration laws or convicted of specific misdemeanors.64 The Secretary
recognized that parents of children who are American citizens or lawful
permanent residents were mostly “hard-working people who have become
integrated members of American society.”65 The November 20th memorandum
greatly expanded DACA, and an estimated four million individuals were eligible
to participate in the new DAPA program and could be considered lawfully
present and eligible for work authorization.66
When twenty-six states challenged the expansion of DACA, leading to a
preliminary injunction, it was a devastation that woke DAPA recipients up from
their American dream into an American nightmare.67 Local governments,
former representatives, and over 200 organizations that provide services to
immigrants defended the new DAPA program, alluding to the economic turmoil
and safety concerns that would arise from the preliminary injunction.68
On November 9, 2015, in Texas, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed for the twenty-six states, holding that the states will likely
succeed on their procedural and substantive APA claims.69 On appeal, Texas
challenged DAPA’s loophole through Texas laws prohibiting the issuing of
driver licenses and unemployment insurance without first verifying proof of
lawful presence.70 At the heart of the issue was the DAPA memorandum’s
64. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5, at 4; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
POLICIES FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
at 3 (2014).
65. Id. at 3.
66. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 148 (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining how out “[o]f the
11.3 million illegal aliens in the United States, 4.3 million would be eligible” to apply for DAPA);
see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5, at 1, 3–4 (detailing that the memorandum
amends Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children (DACA) by allowing those who have been in the country since January 1, 2010,
who are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and who are otherwise not an
enforcement priority, regardless of their age, to apply for lawful presence and accompanying work
authorization in three year increments).
67. See id.; Texas, 809 F.3d at 146; Randy Capps et al., Deferred Action for Unauthorized
Immigrant Parents: Analysis of DAPA’s Potential Effects on Families and Children, MPI (2016),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deferred-action-unauthorized-immigrant-parentsanalysis-dapas-potential-effects-families.
68. Amicus Briefs Filed with the Supreme Court Make the Case for Lifting the Injunction
Against DAPA and Expanded DACA, NILC (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.nilc.org/issues/
immigration-reform-and-executive-actions/united-states-v-state-of-texas/usavtxamicuspoints/.
69. Texas, 809 F.3d at 146; Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (2015) (“This
Court, for the reasons discussed above, hereby grants the Plaintiff States’ request for a preliminary
injunction. It hereby finds that at least Texas has satisfied the necessary standing requirements that
the Defendants have clearly legislated a substantive rule without complying with the procedural
requirements under the Administration Procedure Act.”).
70. Texas, 809 F.3d at 149 (“Texas maintains that documentation confirming lawful presence
pursuant to DAPA would allow otherwise ineligible aliens to become eligible for state-subsidized
driver’s licenses. Likewise, certain unemployment compensation ‘[b]enefits are not payable based
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creation of a new category of millions of lawfully present individuals with
accompanying work authorization.71 According to the DAPA memorandum,
lawful presence granted no substantive right and could be terminated at any
time.72 Yet, DAPA’s “lawful presence” allowed otherwise unlawfully present
aliens access to federal and state benefits, which they would otherwise be barred
from receiving.73 DHS was not allowed to authorize such access without a
statutory grant by Congress, or without going through the necessary notice and
comment procedures of the APA, which it did not.74 The DAPA memorandum
allowed deferred persons to apply for work authorization and, consequently,
social security numbers, allowing individuals to receive benefits payable under
the Social Security Act contrary to federal law.75
States sued the United States to prevent DAPA’s implementation, alleging
first DAPA did not comply with the required procedures of notice and comment
on services performed by an alien unless the alien . . . was lawfully present for purposes of
performing the services.’ Texas contends that DAPA recipients would also become eligible for
unemployment insurance.”) (omissions and alterations in original).
71. Id. at 148–49 (“[T]he government admits in its opening brief, persons granted lawful
presence pursuant to DAPA [and DACA] are no longer ‘bar[red] . . . from receiving social security
retirement benefits, social security disability benefits, or health insurance under Part A of the
Medicare program.”) (omissions and alterations in original).
72. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5, at 2, 5.
73. Texas, 809 F.3d at 148; Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891, 1920 (2020) (“By granting deferred action, the memorandum also made recipients eligible
for certain state and federal benefits, including Medicare and Social Security. In addition, deferred
action enabled the recipients to seek work authorization.”).
74. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 19, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587) (quoting Util.
Air Regul. Grp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (insisting that although the
benefits triggered by DACA were granted by longstanding regulations, 8 U.S.C 1324a(h)(3), which
allowed for work authorization to extend to deferred individuals, it still “cannot reasonably be
interpreted to have ‘br[ought] about [the] enormous and transformative expansion’ in the
Secretary’s authority that would be required to support conferring work authorization in
conjunction with a deferred-action policy like DACA.”) (alterations in original).
75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611; Texas, 809 F.3d at 148–49 (“[T]he government admits . . . persons
granted lawful presence pursuant to DAPA are no longer bar[red] . . . from receiving social security
retirement benefits, social security disability benefits, or health insurance under Part A of the
Medicare program. That follows from § 1611(b)(2)-(3), which provides that the exclusion of
benefits in § 1611(a) ‘shall not apply to any benefit[s] payable under title[s] II [and XVIII] of the
Social Security Act . . . to an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as determined by
the Attorney General . . . .’ A lawfully present alien is still required to satisfy independent
qualification criteria before receiving those benefits, but the grant of lawful presence removes the
categorical bar and thereby makes otherwise ineligible persons eligible to qualify. ‘Each person
who applies for deferred action pursuant to the [DAPA] criteria . . . shall also be eligible to apply
for work authorization for the [renewable three-year] period of deferred action.’ The United States
concedes that ‘[a]n alien with work authorization may obtain a Social Security Number,’ . . . . The
district court determined—and the government does not dispute—’that DAPA recipients would be
eligible for earned income tax credits once they received a Social Security number.’”) (alterations
in original) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra
note 5, at 4–5 (detailing that work authorization accompanies “lawful presence”).
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in violation of the APA.76 Second, even if DAPA fulfilled the notice and
comment requirement, it was still substantively unlawful according to the
APA.77 Third, DAPA was unconstitutional under the Take Care Clause.78
The court concluded that DAPA was not exempt from the notice and comment
requirement of the APA. For DAPA to be exempt from notice and comment, it
must be recognized as an “interpretative rule[], general statement[] of policy, or
rule[] of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”79 Otherwise, if the rule
is found to be substantive, the notice and comment requirement applies.80 The
court utilized two tests to determine if a rule is merely a general statement of
policy or a substantive rule: “whether the rule (1) ‘impose[s] any rights and
obligations’ and (2) ‘genuinely leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to
exercise discretion.’”81 Firstly, the court did not rule that DAPA was a general
statement of policy because the “rule [] modifies substantive rights and interests”
forcing Texas “to choose between spending millions of dollars to subsidize
driver’s licenses and amending its statutes.”82 Secondly, although the DAPA
memorandum—like the DACA memorandum—had discretionary language in
the text, the language was found to be pretext because the rule was “applied by
the agency in a way that indicates it is binding.”83
The APA also exempts “a matter relating to agency management or personnel
or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts” from the note and
comment requirement.84 Although DAPA recipients get “public benefits,” this
type of benefit did not fit into the meaning of “benefits” under the APA. The

76. Texas, 809 F.3d at 149–50; see supra Part I.
77. Id. at 186 (explaining that DACA is substantively unlawful because there is no statutory
right given by Congress to the Secretary of Homeland Security to create a new class of lawfully
present individuals); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c).
78. Texas, 809 F.3d at 149 (ignoring the question of whether the DAPA/DACA is
unconstitutional); supra Part I.
79. Id. at 170–71 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)) (alterations in original).
80. Id. at 171 (quoting Pro. & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th
Cir. 1995) (“In contrast, if a rule is ‘substantive,’ the exemption is inapplicable, and the full panoply
of notice-and-comment requirements must be adhered to scrupulously. The ‘APA’s notice and
comment exemptions must be narrowly construed.’”).
81. Id. (quoting Shalala, 56 F.3d at 595).
82. Id. at 176; Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1920
(2020) (Thomas J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (describing how DACA
gave substantive rights despite the memorandum that prescribed DACA insisting that they were
not).
83. Texas, 809 F.3d at 173–76 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 290 F.3d 377,
383 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (reasoning that DAPA’s discretionary language was pretext because as with
DACA, “DAPA application process itself would preclude discretion: ‘[R]outing DAPA
applications through service centers instead of field offices . . . created an application process that
bypasses traditional in-person investigatory interviews with trained USCIS adjudications officers’
and ‘prevents officers from conducting case-by-case investigations, undermines officers’ abilities
to detect fraud and national-security risks, and ensures that applications will be rubber-stamped.’”).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2).
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court in Baylor University Medical Center v. Heckler narrowed the meaning of
benefits to “clearly and directly relate[s] to ‘benefits’ as that word is used in
section 553(a)(2).”85 The courts further guided the analysis by insisting that the
agency that manages the “benefits” also voluntarily imposes the requirement.86
The court determined that “USCIS—the agency tasked with evaluating DAPA
applications—is not an agency managing benefit programs. Persons who meet
the DAPA criteria do not directly receive the kind of public benefit that has been
recognized, or was likely to have been included, under this exception,” therefore,
the rule did not fall under section 553(a)(2) “benefits exception.”87
The court held that DAPA was also substantively against the APA because it
was “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of
statutory right.”88 It was substantively against the APA to award a class of
individuals work authorization and lawful presence because of Congress’s
comprehensive scheme for granting work authorization and lawful presence and
DHS’s attempts, contrary to any statutory right, with DAPA and expanded
DACA.89
In Texas, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, by an
equally divided vote with no opinion, that DAPA and the expanded DACA were
instituted contrary to the proper procedures set forth in the APA.90
B. Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California
People from outside the United States, who have mostly entered the U.S.
involuntarily and under the age of majority, were recognized as an asset to the
American economy and deferred from deportation.91 Over 600,000 of these
“Americans-[at]-heart” depend on the DACA program as a step closer to
85. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 758 F.2d 1052, 1061 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that
since the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) is left with the task of deciding what is
reasonable reimbursement for hospital services to beneficiaries of the Medicare Program and,
because regulations proscribing the amount and method of reimbursements are “benefits,” HHS
met the “benefits” exception to the notice and comment requirements).
86. Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 611 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[R]ulemaking requirements for
agencies managing benefit programs are still voluntarily imposed—i.e., agency-created statutory
exceptions. Thus, it is only the Department’s own statement of policy that applies the notice and
comment provisions to rulemaking in these programs.”) (emphasis added).
87. Texas, 809 F.3d at 177. USCIS stands for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
88. Id. at 178 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
89. Id. at 180–82 (“The INA’s careful employment-authorization scheme ‘protect[s] against
the displacement of workers in the United States,’ and a ‘primary purpose in restricting immigration
is to preserve jobs for American workers.’ DAPA would dramatically increase the number of aliens
eligible for work authorization, thereby undermining Congress’s stated goal of closely guarding
access to work authorization and preserving jobs for those lawfully in the country.”).
90. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming Texas v. United
States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (2015)) (granting a preliminary injunction because the States properly
showed DAPA and the expanded DACA violated the procedural requirements of the APA).
91. See OFF. OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON IMMIGRATION (2012).
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citizenship.92 Many of them started families, went to college to start a career,
and served in the armed forces.93 Organizations were formed to help these
individuals cope and integrate into American life.94
After the Texas cases, Texas wrote to Attorney General Sessions, insisting
that he rescind DACA because it shared many of the flaws as DAPA, and, if
Attorney General Sessions did not rescind DACA, Texas would revise its claim
and add DACA so that the courts would rule on its constitutionality.95 After he
analyzed the illegality of DACA, the Attorney General wrote a memorandum to
then-acting Secretary Duke, advising her to rescind DACA.96 Acting Secretary
Duke, upon the advice of the Attorney General, rescinded DACA and cited the
Attorney General’s concerns of its illegality and the Texas cases.97
Individual recipients, a civil rights organization, educational institutions, and
five States sued the government after acting Secretary Duke announced the
rescission of DACA.98 They alleged “that the rescission [of DACA] was
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA” and contravened “the equal
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment[].”99 Regents sued in California,
Batalla Vidal sued in New York, and the NAACP sued in Washington D.C.;
“[a]ll three District Courts ruled [in favor of the] plaintiffs.”100 All three courts
rejected DHS’s claim that its actions “were unreviewable under the APA and []
INA.”101 The New York and California courts further held that there was
standing for the Equal Protection claims and issued a nationwide preliminary
injunction after concluding that plaintiffs would most likely succeed on their
APA claim.102 The District of Columbia District Court issued “partial summary
judgment to the plaintiffs’ on their APA claim” but did not rule on their Equal
Protection claim.103

92. See id.
93. Brief for Respondents at 53, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140
S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587); OFF. OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, supra note 91 (“I’ve got a young
person who is serving in our military, protecting us and our freedom. The notion that in some ways
we would treat them as expendable makes no sense. If there is a young person here who has grown
up here and wants to contribute to this society, wants to maybe start a business that will create jobs
for other folks who are looking for work, that’s the right thing to do. Giving certainty to our farmers
and our ranchers; making sure that in addition to border security, we’re creating a comprehensive
framework for legal immigration—these are all the right things to do.”).
94. Martha Ramirez, These are the Top Organizations that Support DACA, BLUE TENT
(2020), https://bluetent.us/articles/policy-advocacy/top-organizations-that-support-DACA/.
95. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 8.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1903 (2020).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1903–04.
102. Id. at 1904.
103. Id.
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The Supreme Court granted the Government’s petition for certiorari.104 The
Supreme Court held that DHS’s decision to rescind DACA was reviewable,
arbitrary, and capricious under the APA.105
1. Reviewability: Heckler v. Chaney
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that there was an exception to
the presumption of judicial review under the APA.106 The Supreme Court
articulated the exception as applying to “agency actions ‘committed to agency
discretion,’” which includes the “exercise[] of ‘prosecutorial discretion’” in a
decision to “not [] institute an enforcement action.”107
The Supreme Court said that the reviewability of DACA did not fall under the
exception because it was not merely a non-enforcement decision; rather, it
“created a program for conferring affirmative immigration relief.”108 This ruling
by the Supreme Court is contrary to Heckler and the memorandum which created
DACA.109 Heckler made a distinction between non-enforcement decisions and
affirmative actions by stating that an agency’s non-enforcement action is
presumed unreviewable; however, an agency’s non-enforcement decision may
be considered an affirmative action, and thus reviewable, when there is already
a statute which sets the procedures for exercising agency enforcement powers.110
Here, there are no clearly defined factors that provide guidelines to the Secretary
of Homeland Security on how to exercise their prosecutorial discretion.111
Neither can the DACA memorandum, a rule promulgated contrary to the APA,
be said to have produced binding law setting the procedures for enforcement
action.112 So, the rescission of DACA resembles non-enforcement agency
action.

104. Id. at 1905.
105. Id. at 1907, 1915.
106. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
107. Id. at 827 (citing to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).
108. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1906.
109. Contra id. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the
“memorandum confers no substantive right.”).
110. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33.
111. Id. (suggesting that a “presumptively unreviewable” action “may be rebutted where the
substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement
power”). See also 6 U.S.C. 202(5) (stating merely that “[t]he Secretary shall be responsible for . . .
[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.”).
112. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1928 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (“Because DHS failed to engage in the statutorily mandated process, DACA never gained
status as a legally binding regulation . . . .”).

422

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:405

2. Reviewability: Protected Benefits
The Court also stated that the benefits granted to DACA recipients were
benefits the courts often protected.113 In the DACA memorandum, the Secretary
of Homeland Security stated:
For individuals who are granted deferred action by either ICE or
USCIS, USCIS shall accept applications to determine whether these
individuals qualify for work authorization during this period of
deferred action. This memorandum confers no substantive right,
immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only the Congress,
acting through its legislative authority, can confer these rights. It
remains for the executive branch, however, to set forth policy for the
exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing law. I have
done so here.114
DACA recipients’ “benefits” are incurred because the DACA memorandum
created a new group of lawfully present individuals who may apply for work
authorization.115 The style in which these “benefits” are granted is unique to
DACA, and the authority granted to the Secretary by 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3) to
proffer such benefits cannot reasonably be interpreted to have “‘br[ought] about
[the] enormous and transformative expansion’ in the Secretary’s authority that
would be required to support conferring work authorization in conjunction with
a deferred-action policy like DACA.”116
3. Arbitrary and Capricious: Reasoned Analysis
The holding of Regents also concluded because acting Secretary Duke wholly
relied on the Attorney General Sessions’ illegality determination “to rescind
both the benefit and forbearance” —which the Fifth Circuit distinguished in the
DAPA case—this error failed “to supply the requisite ‘reasoned analysis,’”
similar to the mistake made in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm
Mutual Automotive Ins. Co.117 The Court held that this error alone was arbitrary
and capricious against the APA.118

113. Id. at 1906 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)) (majority opinion).
114. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 3.
115. Id.
116. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 28, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 573 U.S.
302, 324 (2014)) (alterations in original).
117. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912–13; see also, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983). Cf. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1930 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority has no answer except to suggest that this
approach is inconsistent with State Farm. But in doing so, the majority ignores the fact that, unlike
the typical ‘prior policy’ contemplated by the Court in State Farm, DACA is unlawful.”) (quoting
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983)).
118. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912 (majority opinion).
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There is a distinction between State Farm and this case. State Farm did not
involve a rescission of an administrative act that was implemented contrary to
the APA.119 DACA created a new group of lawfully present individuals who
qualified for work authorization.120 As with DAPA, this is not within the
authority of the Secretary without first going through the notice and comment
requirements of administrative rule making because lawful presence modified
substantive rights, and such rules are not exempt from APA’s procedures.121 The
majority in Regents did not cite any case in which agency actions to rescind a
rule promulgated contrary to the APA were reviewable or required a reasoned
analysis for rescission.122
4. Arbitrary and Capricious: Legitimate Reliance
Another reason why DACA was held to be arbitrary and capricious was that
the Duke memorandum failed to consider if “there was ‘legitimate reliance’ on
the DACA Memorandum.”123 The Court reasoned that DHS should have
considered other accommodations to remedy reliance interest.124 DHS’s failure
to weigh the reliance interest against competing policy concerns was found to
be arbitrary and capricious.125 So, the reliance on the DACA policy by 600,000
aliens outweighed the reasons given by DHS to rescind, which were because the
DACA policy itself was contrary to statutory right, contrary to the rule making
procedures of the APA, and disturbed the balance of powers between the three
branches of government.126
However, the memorandum for recission of DACA does consider other
accommodations to remedy reliance.127 Acting Secretary Duke stated in the
Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum:
[I]n light of the administrative complexities associated with ending the
program, [the Attorney General] recommended that the Department
wind [DACA] down in an efficient and orderly fashion, and his office
has reviewed the terms on which our Department will do so . . . . [T]he
Department: Will adjudicate—on an individual, case-by-case basis—
119. Id. at 1930 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
120. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 1, at 3.
121. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pro. & Patients for
Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1995)).
122. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1929.
123. Id. at 1913 (majority opinion).
124. Id.; see also id. at 1930 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]he majority claims that DHS erred by failing to take into account the reliance interests of
DACA recipients. But reliance interests are irrelevant when assessing whether to rescind an action
that the agency lacked statutory authority to take. No amount of reliance could ever justify
continuing a program that allows DHS to wield power that neither Congress nor the Constitution
gave it.”).
125. Id. at 1913 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 1930 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
127. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 8.
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properly filed pending DACA initial requests and associated
applications for Employment Authorization Documents that have
been accepted by the Department as of the date of this memorandum .
. . . Will adjudicate—on an individual, case by case basis—properly
filed pending DACA renewal requests and associated applications for
Employment Authorization Documents from current beneficiaries that
have been accepted by the Department as of the date of this
memorandum, and from current beneficiaries whose benefits will
expire between the date of this memorandum and March 5, 2018 that
have been accepted by the Department as of October 5, 2017.128
So, the reliance interest of those who initiated their application for DACA or
tried to renew their DACA status before the date of the memorandum is more
than likely to be granted DACA status for another three years.129 DACA was
not supposed to be a permanent status; even the expanded DACA memorandum
acknowledged this fact stating, “it may be terminated at any time at the agency’s
discretion.”130
IV. TESTING REGENTS: UNDERMINING THE PEACEFUL TRANSFER OF POWER
In Regents, four justices concurred with the majority’s ruling that the
rescission of DACA did not pose an equal protection claim but dissented with
the ruling that the rescission of DACA was reviewable, arbitrary, and capricious
according to the APA.131 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas states:
[G]oing forward, when a rescinding agency inherits an invalid
legislative rule that ignored virtually every rulemaking requirement of
the APA, it will be obliged to overlook that reality. Instead of simply
terminating the program because it did not go through the requisite
process, the agency will be compelled to treat an invalid legislative
rule as though it were legitimate.132
The Thomas dissenting opinion stressed that the cases the majority cited to
analogize DHS’s agency actions as being against the APA were not cases
involving an unlawful executive action.133 Even if DHS’s prosecutorial
discretion was reviewable, the Supreme Court has no precedent which
succumbed an agency’s action to the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5, at 2.
131. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1918–19, 1933, 1936 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 1929.
133. Id. (“[T]he majority . . . cites no authority for the proposition that arbitrary and capricious
review requires an agency to dissect an unlawful program piece by piece, scrutinizing each separate
element to determine whether it would independently violate the law, rather than just to rescind the
entire program.”).
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when rescinding an unlawful action or a rescission of an action instituted
contrary to the APA’s notice and comment requirements—until Regents.134
The Take Care Clause prohibits executive actions contrary to laws passed by
Congress. Faithful execution of the laws does not mean that the executive
agency can make its own laws when Congress did not give them the discretion
to do so. The Take Care Clause also does not mean implementing policy
contrary to congressional procedures set within the APA or the INA. However,
the Take Care Clause bars acting in accordance with an unlawful policy. Since
the DACA policy was instituted contrary to the APA and contrary to any agency
discretion granted by Congress, it should not have been treated as a reviewable
agency action when being rescinded.135
Regents held that an agency decision to rescind a rule promulgated contrary
to the APA is nevertheless subject to judicial review under the APA. The
recission decision must not violate the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard,
no matter the legality of the action being rescinded. That is the new test under
Regents, and administrations going forward will conjure this new power,
especially when Congress fails to pass laws concerning bipartisan issues.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Alito forewarned the new role that
the Federal Judiciary plays because of Regents’ holding stating, “[a]nyone
interested in the role that the Federal Judiciary now plays in our constitutional
system should consider what has happened in these cases.”136 He hinted at a
political undermining and utilizing the Federal Judiciary to hinder subsequent
administrations’ attempts to regulate politically delicate issues.137
During the end of the Trump presidency, between the date of the election and
the inauguration, the former President of the United States instituted several
rules. Rules made during this short period are called “midnight rules,” but the
Trump administration delivered a unique twist on these rules using several
134. Id. at 1922 (“The decision to rescind an unlawful agency action is per se lawful. No
additional policy justifications or considerations are necessary. And, the majority’s contrary
holding—that an agency is not only permitted, but required, to continue an ultra vires action—has
no basis in law.”).
135. Id. at 1926–27 (“No court can compel Executive Branch officials to exceed their
congressionally delegated powers by continuing a program that was void ab initio . . . . In reviewing
agency action, our role is to ensure that Executive Branch officials do not transgress the proper
bounds of their authority not to perpetuate a decision to unlawfully wield power in direct
contravention of the enabling statute’s clear limits.”) (internal citation omitted).
136. Id. at 1932 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. (“Early in the term of the current President, his administration took the controversial
step of attempting to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Shortly
thereafter, one of the nearly 700 federal district court judges blocked this rescission, and since then,
this issue has been mired in litigation. In November 2018, the Solicitor General filed petitions for
certiorari, and today, the Court still does not resolve the question of DACA’s rescission. Instead,
it tells the Department of Homeland Security to go back and try again. What this means is that the
Federal Judiciary, without holding that DACA cannot be rescinded, has prevented that from
occurring during an entire Presidential term. Our constitutional system is not supposed to work
that way.”).
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exceptions to rule making.138 Some of these new immediately effective
midnight rules do not go through notice and comment. Just like the Trump
administration and DACA, President Biden will have to go through APA notice
and comment procedures if he wants to rescind some of Trump’s immediately
effective midnight rules or rules the Trump administration promulgated contrary
to APA rule making requirements.139
CONCLUSION
Although more than 700,000 “Americans-at-heart” may have relied on
DACA, the act does not pass lawful inspection. It is clear that DACA shares
some of the legal flaws as DAPA, and it is also clear that DHS has the power to
rescind DACA at any time. What is not clear is the legal precedent upon which
the Regents’ holding rests. The holding in Regents is contrary to the
Constitution, INA, HSA, and the APA’s rule making procedures. Yet it has the
capacity to thwart a rescission of an action by an executive agency promulgated
pursuant to a constitutional duty to Take Care the laws be faithfully executed.
The holding of Regents will influence future administrations to act unlawfully,
but strategically, in hopes of straining their successors and arguably already has
with the Trump administration’s unique twist on immediately effective midnight
rule making.
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